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The evaluation of the effectiveness of the medical services in the Portuguese Public-Private 
Partnership (PPP) hospitals is a very relevant problem in public policy. The study was conducted 
using a research protocol created by distinguished academics fulfilling a request from World 
Health Organization. The eight dimensions of this protocol was used as a good guideline to 
understand and appraise the main features and interactions of the PPP model. The study then 
proceeded by considering one of these characteristics, the performance and outcome aspect, 
through a two tier analysis. First a comparison of the outcome indicators between the four PPP 
hospitals and the Portuguese public hospitals’ national system. The second was a productivity 
analysis of the hospital activity, considering several inputs (medical staff, hospital capacity and 
population served). 
The results from 2012 to 2014 show that PPP hospitals present a pattern of activity and results 
very similar to the rest of the national service, with a positive trend in performance on all four 
PPP hospitals. In what regards productivity, however, the levels of PPP hospitals seem to be 
considerably higher than the national average, in all inputs. This indicates the ability to produce 
the same with much lower use of resources. 
This preliminary study reveals some interesting stylized facts of medical services of PPP 
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Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) in the last decades have proliferated around the World 
accompanied by great controversy1. Many articles have been published in the academia world, 
however there is much still to be studied as PPPs are complex and multifaceted models. 
Portugal presents a wide experience in the use of PPPs to govern several sectors. In the health 
sector, Portugal has proven to be pioneer in the use of PPPs to run hospital’s buildings as well 
as medical services integrated in the SNS. The clinical services of four major SNS hospitals are 
currently under a PPP contract. 
The thesis has as main purpose the operational and value production of the medical services. To 
guide this purpose, a research protocol was implemented to analyse each partnership in the 
most important aspects of its framework. This is an approach significantly different from the 
traditional financial consideration of PPP institutions. The thesis aims to give a tentative answer 
to the question of whether the PPP hospitals are different from the others, not so much in the 
cost dimension but in its operation and service. This aim is much more ambitious than other 
approaches and clashed with the empirical limitations faced. This is the central reason for some 
rough aspects of the corresponding chapters. 
The analysis performed in this study is twofold. First a service analysis of value comparison that 
show homogeneous figures between PPP hospitals and the national average. A second analysis 
focused on productivity by comparing outcome indicators with medical staff, hospital capacity 
and population served. Once again this comparison was made between each PPP hospital and 
the national average of all public hospitals. 
The results obtained revealed a similarity of service levels between the four PPP hospitals and 
the public hospitals. A conclusion that indicates a synchronization pattern that is present in SNS 
hospitals through the country. Nonetheless, when productivity was analysed it was discovered 
a higher pattern in PPPs compared to public hospitals. A finding that seems to suggest a higher 
effectiveness in PPP hospitals by producing the same services with less resources. 
An improvement trend was also shown across most indicators in all PPP hospitals. This beneficial 
trend could indicate a favourable effect from public and private interaction compared to public 
hospitals. Another conclusion of this study is a slightly positive distinction of Braga Hospital in 
productivity levels. 
The thesis poses as a preliminary analysis of medical services in Portuguese PPP hospitals. The 
results obtained implied some positive aspects and trends of the partnerships institutions. 
                                                          
1 Consider Bult-Spiering and Dewulf (2006), Sarmento and Renneboog (2014) and Torchia et al (2015) 
2 
 
However further studies are necessary for a more profound comprehension of PPP medical 
services. Some considerations for future analysis highlight the importance of environmental 
factors as demographic aspects and SNS interaction. 
In the next section a brief literature review presents the current status of the PPP research. It 
also succinctly raises the main questions surrounding this model and describes the Portuguese 
experience concentrating in the health sector. In section 3 the qualitative analysis of the PPPs is 
explained. Through the implementation of the research protocol, the 8 aspects proposed are 
described and evaluated. Section 4 presents both quantitative analysis that were made to 
service and productivity. Finally the study culminates with section 5 where the main findings and 




2. Literature Review 
The literature relevant for health PPPs is vast and diverse, as there are many aspects to take into 
account in this complex reality. First, there are some rules for the implementation of the 
organizational model2. As several years of worldwide experience have already been gathered, 
some results are available3. In the case of hospitals, the particularities of the health sector play 
an important role4. 
Although still recent, the question of the health PPPs also has some evaluations available5. It 
should particularly be mentioned the existence of surveys. The most relevant are the literary 
reviews in IOB (2013) and Torchia et al (2015), the first of which centers on developing countries. 
This thesis is not the place for an exhaustive consideration of this very wide literature. Only some 
general and important conclusions are worth mentioning. 
2.1. Origin and justification 
All the studies refer the fact that governments worldwide struggle to reach an equilibrium 
between increasing healthcare costs in an environment of decreasing public budgets. This is the 
determining constraint behind the model. “Governments facing increased fiscal stringency can 
no longer sustain open-ended financing of infrastructure. And societies today hold 
infrastructure to higher environmental standard” (World Bank, 1994, p. 6). 
Besides this resource constraint, the PPP structure deals directly with a central puzzle in the 
health sector. “Both the public and the private sector recognize their individual inabilities to 
address the emerging public health issues that continue to be tabled on the international and 
within-country policy agendas" (Nishtar, 2004, p. 7). By combining both approaches PPP are thus 
particularly adequate for this public service. 
These two elements may be considered as the main drives for a process which has been 
gathering momentum for several years. 
                                                          
2 Main examples are UNECE (2008), OECD (2012) and EPEC (2014) 
3 Consider as relevant Monteiro (2005), Grimsey and Lewis (2005), OECD (2008), Basílio (2011), OECD 
(2013), Tang and Shen (2013), Sarmento and Renneboog (2014) 
4 For the Portuguese case it is important to consider, among others, Costa and Lopes (2007), Ministério 
da Saúde (2010), World Health Organization (2010), Deloitte (2011), Barros (2013) and EPEC (2014). 
5 As relevant examples should be mentioned Reich (2000), the already mentioned Simões (2004), McKee 
et al (2006), Espigares and Torres (2011), Nikjoo et al (2012) and in Portugal the reports of Tribunal de 
Contas (2009) and the continual evaluations of UTAP at Ministério das Finanças. 
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2.2. Implementation of the Model 
Public Private Partnerships in health registered a huge boom in the 1990’s. This is 
contemporaneous with the introduction of reform packages in several countries seen as 
embracing social cohesion (in Barr, 2007 and Torchia et al, 2015). “Recently there has been 
enthusiasm for using public– private partnerships to improve the delivery of health and welfare 
services for a wider range of health problems, especially in developing countries” (Barr, 2007, p. 
19). The evolution has been so dramatic that some authors consider it politically irreversible. 
“PPPs in the health care sector therefore seem to be both unavoidable and imperative” (Torchia 
et al, 2015, p. 239). 
It should be mentioned that the model has registered in Portugal an important development 
which has merited even the qualification of pioneering. The inclusion of hospital services 
management in the structure of PPP represents a bold innovation which other countries 
avoided. “Portugal was a pioneer in the introduction of this model, because although the UK 
already used PPP in the health sector, their model encompasses only the component of the 
hospital building (construction and operation / maintenance)” (Basílio, 2011, p.97). “The reason 
why this model is consider as innovator and complex is that in the international experience PPPs 
only apply to the construction and management of the infrastructure, and not to medical 
services” (Sarmento and Renneboog, 2014, p.4). 
The boom was not merely operational but also intellectual. The health care sector academics 
have turned their attention to PPP projects. As has already been mentioned, the number of 
published articles related to the subject has increased substantially in the past decades 
identifying problems, methods and solutions in PPPs models. 
2.3. Mixed evaluation 
The unequivocal trend of PPP in health sectors does not translate necessarily into a positive 
evaluation of the experience by the studies performed. It could even be said there is a lack of 
evidence to support the PPP enthusiasm. 
The problems identified are several. The first is conceptual uncertainty, as there is “no common 
understanding about what precisely constitutes a public–private partnership” (Barr, 2007, p. 
19). Also, the inner complexity of the PPP structure creates, by itself, some obstacles. In 
particular “considerable skepticism exists about the motives of private firms that engage in 
partnerships” (Reich, 2000, p. 619). 
One facet of PPPs that have brought huge controversy comes from the political point of view. 
For some left wing militants the PPP model is seen as a masked privatization of important 
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services. “Confusion about the PPP concept is striking in the political and social discussion on 
these governance questions. Often, PPP is used as synonym for privatization. (…) The confusion 
impedes a rational discussion about PPPs since all the disadvantages of privatization are imputed 
to PPPs.” (Bult-Spiering and Dewulf 2006 p. 3). “In many cases, PPPs are simply neoliberal 
solutions in disguise, i.e., they amount to the privatization and de-regulation of formerly public 
services. This seems to be very much the case concerning PPPs in humanitarian aid and the 
development sector” (Börzel and Risse, 2002, p. 15) 
More relevant, the studies do not show a clear picture. The advances in the understanding of 
PPPs effects have been few. Torchia et al (2015) state that “there is no general agreement on 
their main benefits. In particular, doubts remain concerning their actual effectiveness, efficiency 
and convenience in the health care sector” (Torchia et al, 2015, p. 239). The judgement of the 
studies can be considered disappointing: “the success of public–private partnerships in this 
context appears to be mixed, and few data are available to evaluate their effectiveness” (Barr, 
2007, p. 19). 
As was stated in the conclusion of a survey, “despite the increasing attention PPPs are gaining 
in the health sector worldwide, some questions remain unanswered. Future research should 
provide more empirical results on the actual effectiveness, efficiency and convenience of PPPs 
as solutions for public health care system problems.” (Torchia et al, 2015, p. 259). 
2.4. The Portuguese Case 
Portugal has a mounting experience with PPPs. Since 1994 with the start of two contracts, in 
road sector and health sector, PPPs have been present in Portugal. Nonetheless, the growing 
amount of vivid information has done little to stimulate the academia world. “The Portuguese 
history with PPP had started approximately two decades ago and yet, there is a scarcity of papers 
on the topic.” (Basílio, 2011, p. 73). 
In the last years the number of PPPs have grown and covered 4 main sectors: roads, trains, 
security and health. In total 32 partnerships are now in force, with the majority of these in the 
road sector. The rapid rhythm of partnerships in past years highlighted Portugal in the 
international sphere. In 2008 the Court of Auditors (Tribunal de Contas) stated in one report that 
“Portugal is currently, the European country with the highest percentage of PPP both in growth 
domestic product and in state budget” (Tribunal e Contas, 2008, p. 1, translated by the author). 
Another particularity of this accelerated rate was the separation from the legal system. The pace 
imposed by the expanding number of partnerships could not be mimicked by the legislation. In 
the same report of 2008, the Court of Auditors declared “The procurement model of PPP 
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advanced in Portugal before the specific legal and budget framework was developed” (Tribunal 
de Contas, 2008, p. 1, translated by the author). 
The health sector has nowadays 8 partnerships divided in 4 hospitals. However seven health 
institutions were, so far, developed under a PPP contract. The extensive Portuguese PPP 
experience counts with three already finished partnerships that raise much debate in its 
evaluation. The first was Hospital Fernando da Fonseca, a partnership on the medical service 
and hospital management which ended with little or no process evaluation. In their study on the 
subject in 2008, Adelino et al. observed that the private experience of a public hospital 
concluded without a global and careful evaluation that identified the advantages and 
inconveniences of the model, the impact on the health system and the results obtained6. 
The second and third controversial health PPPs were a rehabilitation and medical center in 
Algarve and a centralized service of telephonic assistance that did not persist for too long due 
to operational and financial problems. 
Nonetheless, many more partnerships were planned to exist with the purpose of developing the 
SNS. “One of the mechanisms that the government has used to improve NHS capacity and value 
for money has been through an increased use of private entities to build, maintain and operate 
health facilities, under the so-called PPPs.” (Barros et al., 2011, p. 46). 
In Portugal every hospital under PPP model has two contracts with two different private 
partners. One type of the contracts is made with a construction and building maintenance 
company. The purpose of this contract is to elaborate on the new facilities and how they will be 
design, produced and maintained in a time span of 30 years. All the four current hospitals under 
PPP regimes had a new facility built either with the purpose of transferring from an old hospital 
or to start a new institution in a place where there were none. The second type of contracts 
covers the medical services provided by the hospital and its staff. This thesis will focus only in 
this type of contract of the four existing PPP hospitals. 
Of the four hospitals, Cascais Hospital is the most ancient one. The partners of Cascais signed 
the contract in February 2008, started their functions in the old building in January 2009 and 
made the transfer to the new facilities in February 2010. 
The Braga Hospital had a different timeline with the contract signed in February 2009, managing 
the hospital in the old building since September 2009 and transferred in May 2011. 
                                                          
6 “Ficou assim anunciada a conclusão da experiência de gestão privada de um hospital público sem que 
tenha sido disponibilizada uma avaliação global criteriosa que identificasse as vantagens e os 
inconvenientes do modelo, o seu impacto no sistema de saúde e os resultados obtidos medidos…” 
(Adelino et al., 2008,p. 5) 
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Loures Hospital is the third hospital to change into PPP management. This hospital has the 
particularity of not having a previous facility. The private partner signed the contract in 
December 2009 but only started to exert their functions in January 2012 at the new hospital 
building. 
The last one is Vila Franca de Xira, in which the contract was signed on October 2010, then 
started their activity in June 2011 at the old hospital and transferred in May 2013. 
There are visible differences between the four PPP hospitals in Portugal. The main distinction is 
the size of each hospital. ACSS created a classification of their institutions which organizes each 
hospital, hospital center or health unit in 6 groups. This categorization has into account the 
institutions size, medical specialties available and SNS interaction. In this outline, Braga Hospital 
is considered in a higher group than Loures and Cascais. Vila Franca de Xira is the smalles of the 




3. Structured Analysis of Portuguese PPP Hospitals 
The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the effectiveness of health services provided by the 
Portuguese Hospitals under PPP regime. Thereby, the scope of the thesis is limited to medical 
services and the partners directly associated. Despite the doubled structure of the PPP contracts 
of these institutions, the private partners responsible for the construction and maintenance of 
the buildings are not considered in this analysis. 
To guide the evaluation of effectiveness in Portuguese PPP’s Hospitals, a research protocol was 
implemented. Published in 2007, the protocol was presented in the article “Research Protocol 
to Evaluate the Effectiveness of Public-Private Partnerships as a Means to improve Health and 
Welfare Systems Worldwide” of Dr. Donald Barr. The main particularity of this protocol was that 
it was made as response to direct request from the World Health Organization (WHO). To fulfil 
the request, 9 prominent scholars from around the United States of America convened in a two 
days meeting to discuss the issue. When the protocol was finished and published the World 
Health Organization had to turn their attention to more urgent matters and cut the finance for 
the implementation of this protocol. 
This research protocol is divided in eight principal aspects which will be addressed in the 
following chapter. Due to the similarity between the four Portuguese PPP hospitals’ contracts, 
they are described as a group, highlighting the main characteristics in the following aspects. 
However, any important distinguishing feature of each partnership is also included in the 
description. 
3.1. The Relationship Between Public and Private Sectors 
The first aspect of the research protocol is the clear definition of each partner and the 
characterization of the market system in which they operate. 
For all four PPP hospitals considered, there are two partners involved in the health services. The 
public partner, the Portuguese Government, is represented by the ARS of the hospital’s area of 
influence. The ARS are regional institution with public rights that integrate Indirect State 
Administration. There are five ARS (Norte, Centro, Lisboa e Vale do Tejo, Alentejo and Algarve) 
which are under the health minister tutelage. The private partners are anonymous companies 
to whom their main shareholder is one of the three most known private health providers in 
Portugal. These companies are market-based for-profit organizations with wide health 
management experience. 
One of the companies is Lusíadas Saúde, a health provider group founded in 1998. In February 
2008, when the PPP contract was signed, Lusíadas Saúde, by then Hospitais Privados de Portugal, 
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was part of Grupo Caixa Geral de Depósitos, a holding of the public bank Caixa Geral de 
Depósitos. Lusíadas Saúde changed its name in 2012 when it was acquired by AMIL, a Brazilian 
health company of the UnitedHealth Group, a worldwide differentiated health provider. Today, 
Lusíadas Saúde manages nine private health institutions of which five are hospitals including one 
PPP. 
A second company is Luz Saúde, founded in 2000 with the name Espírito Santo Saúde as part of 
the Espírito Santo Group. By the end of 2009, when it signed the partnership contract, Espírito 
Santo Saúde, had grown in expertise and renown in the private health sector. At the beginning 
of 2014, the company entered the Euronext Lisbon Stock Exchange. Few months later, a large 
majority of the company was bought by Fidelidade, a Portuguese insurance company that had 
been acquired by a Chinese private-owned conglomerate called Fosun. After the purchase was 
made, the name changed to Luz Saúde. Nowadays Luz Saúde operates eighteen institutions of 
which nine are private hospitals and one PPP. 
The final private company is José de Mello Saúde. Founded in 1945 as part of Grupo CUF 
(Companhia União Fabril) which later became Grupo José de Mello. The company has a long 
history in Portugal, among other achievements, had the first hospital as a PPP of the health 
sector in Portugal, Hospital Fernando da Fonseca from 1995 until 2008. José de Mello Saúde 
currently has eighteen health institutions from which seven are hospitals including the two PPP. 
The two partners involved in each partnership differ for every hospital. 
Hospital Dr. José de Almeida in Cascais is the result of a partnership between the public partner 
ARS Lisboa e Vale do Tejo, I.P. and private partner HPP Saúde – Parceiras Cascais, S.A. which the 
main shareholder is Lusíadas Saúde, formerly HPP (Hospitais Privados de Portugal).  
Hospital Beatriz Ângelo in Loures comes from the partnership of ARS Lisboa e Vale do Tejo, I.P. 
and SGHL – Sociedade Gestora do Hospital de Loures, S.A. subsidiary of Luz Saúde, formely 
Espírito Santo Saúde. 
Hospital de Braga combines the efforts of ARS Norte, I.P. with Escala Braga – Sociedade Gestora 
do Estabelecimento, S.A., a company linked to José de Mello Saúde. 
Hospital de Vila Franca de Xira operates under the partnership of ARS Lisboa e Vale do Tejo, I.P. 
and Escala Vila Franca – Sociedade Gestora do Estabelecimento, S.A. which is also linked to José 
de Mello Saúde. 
All three private partners, of the four PPPs, are well established and successful healthcare 
providers with great experience in hospital management. 
The Portuguese health sector is a highly regulated market system that is greatly influenced by 
the SNS, a nationwide public network of healthcare providers. This network was created in 1979 
to exert the universal right of health protection to all citizens described in the national 
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constitution. Nowadays the SNS has a wide range of hospitals, health centers and health units 
scattered all over the country. Under the tutelage of the Portuguese Ministry of Health, the 
network is managed by the ACSS which divides the country in areas of influence of the five ARS. 
The goals of these institutions are guided by the National Health Plan which is defined every 4 
years by the DGS and approved by the Government. 
Although the SNS has a national coverage that ranges throughout Portugal, half of the 
Portuguese hospitals are private institutions. The private sector in health has a growing range of 
institutions and practices in Portugal. These services are regulated by public organisms, like the 
DGS that issues the norms. And the IGAS which is responsible for auditing, inspect, supervise 
and perform disciplinary actions to healthcare providers. Both these institutions are under 
Direct State Administration and respond to the Ministry of Health and the Government. Another 
important organism in the Health sector is the ERS, an independent public entity that regulates 
the health market by investigating complaints from customers or other institutions and issues 
recommendations or sanctions accordingly. 
3.2. Nature of the Partnership between Public and Private Participants 
Secondly, the research protocol demands an accurate description of the relation between both 
parties. In the Portuguese case, the four PPPs were created under an employer-employee 
relation. The partnership has the model of private sector investment in the public sector service 
program. To assume the public responsibility of universal coverage in each hospital with the use 
of public resources and private expertise. 
The agreement is formalized under a strict contract detailing expected outcomes and financial 
arrangements for the ten year duration of the contract and the possible two renewals of 10 
years more. In these contracts, the financial incentives are described to attract the private 
partner into providing the expected services with their management expertise. The expected 
benefits of the partnerships are based in a symbiotic complementarity reinforcing the service 
quality. The public side is expected to achieve the established health practice services and 
resources management with more stable and controlled costs. The private partner has the 
possibility to explore the business related to the services with state approval and public visibility 
while achieving a perceived fair value for the services provided. Another possible benefit for the 
private partner is the prospect of achieving the expected service with improved resources 
management that allows to reduce the costs and achieve profits. 
An important aspect of this relation is the dynamic nature of the expected outcomes. The 
production levels are not static measures that the hospitals must achieve but established 
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comparative data to other public hospitals, selected to be the reference group. With this 
dynamic the hospitals performance levels are adjusted to external causes that would impact the 
whole sector and would establish a stronger link to public hospitals and the SNS goals. 
3.3. Financial Arrangements of the Public-Private Partnership Project 
This aspect of the research protocol, intends to clarify the financing model of the enhanced 
service provision. The financial arrangements of these partnerships are dynamic systems 
strengthen by an initial forecast formula that is later corrected with the actual figures. This 
systems allows for concurrent monthly payments of a large percentage and subsequent yearly 
adjustment to correct the amount. The next image illustrate the financial system through a 
scheme that shows the financial flow. 
Insert image 1 [PPP Hospital financial flow] here 
The financial flow moves mostly in the private partner direction but is supported by three 
financial sources: patients, third-party financiers and public partner. 
One of the sources is created by patients that have to pay an amount for the service that was 
provided to them. If the person attends the hospital under the SNS, she is committed to pay a 
hospital charge that can vary considering the socioeconomic status of the patient and the service 
performed. These charges are stipulated by the Ministry of Health and are applied nationwide 
under the same set of rules for public hospitals and PPP hospitals. Some patients, however, are 
insured by a third-party financiers allowing them to pay a special price called copayment. This 
special price is the fruit of a negotiation between the insurance company and the Hospital. Amid 
this payments by the patient, the hospital also receives another payment directly from the 
insurance company that fulfills the negotiated cost for the procedure. Other patients can also 
chose to pay the full price of the service provided and afterwards present it to the insurance 
company to be partially reimbursed. All these possible payments are mainly made immediately 
before or after the patient has benefited from the hospital services and they are paid directly to 
the private partner. 
The second financial source, third-party agents, hosts different enterprises that can be divided 
in two groups, health subsystems or insurance companies and catering & vending companies. 
The latter group are privately held enterprises that rent the space to develop secondary services 
not linked to the hospital ongoing functionality. They establish food and beverage points of sale 
either through a vending machine or a cafeteria. Each hospital has the autonomy to negotiate 
the supply contract and collect the rent. This money is then divided by the entities of the 
partnership, 25% to the public partner and 75% to the private partner. 
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Another third-party financiers group are like health subsystems & insurance companies, which 
are organizations that co-finance health related costs through an established agreement in the 
form of a contract among the insured and the insurer. In this agreements, the terms of financing 
are described in the policies, establishing how the costs are divided between the patient and the 
company. Most insurance companies establish a direct relation with some health services 
providers, like hospitals, in order to negotiate better prices for their costumers and create a 
reliable network of providers. In these cases is the provider responsibility to engage the 
organizations with the purpose of informing the costs and collecting the insurer share of the 
payment. In PPP hospitals’, is the private partner that manages these relations and collects the 
money. Once the payments are done, it is separated in four amounts. The first amount is due to 
the private partner for the effort of managing and collecting the payment. This amount 
corresponds to 5% of the total payment received. The second amount is computed in order to 
cover the actual costs of the service provided, which is also made to the private partner. 
Subtracting these two amounts from the total computes the sum of the third and fourth amount, 
the remaining value. This value is divided between the private and public partner in the weights 
of 25% and 75%, respectively. 
The last financial source is the main source and one of the entities in the partnership, the public 
partner. This partner is the main financier of the project empowering the private partner with 
the operational and management responsibilities of the hospital. Due to the importance of the 
entity and the proportion of money involved, this source has a more complex financial model. 
An important characteristic of the financial model is to establish a continuous financial flow from 
the public partner, which is crucial for the hospital financial equilibrium. The payment amount 
of this partner is computed using established formulas, as described in the image 2 [PPP Hospital 
financial formulas] (appendix 2). The Nacional Health Service (SNS) total payment is calculated 
by achieving the base remuneration of all services performed during the year and then 
subtracting the payments received from other sources as well as the money due to the public 
partner. For the base remuneration, the formula covers four different sections. First is the price 
of the hospital production along the year in all services. Secondly, the established price for the 
continuous operation of the emergency department is added alongside an adjustment according 
to the contributions of the prescribed medication. After summing these three values, a discount 
is made according to the amount of deductions imposed due to performance evaluation. 
Hospital production includes the services of patient’s hospitalization and surgeries, 
hospitalization of qualified patients for RNCCI, emergency care services, outpatients care and 
appointments, day hospital consults and an undefined special cases part for less common 
services, for example mechanically assisted ventilation. Each of these services is computed using 
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a specific formula that multiplies the amount performed with the price established, but also 
accounts for special considerations of each service, as patients quotas, different diagnosis 
related groups or indexes of complexity (see appendix 2 IMAGE [PPP Hospital financial 
formulas]). To the overall payment amount of production, availability and medication, a 
discount related to performance is need to compute the base remuneration value. The 
deduction amount is described in the contract in the form of an evaluation system aimed at the 
hospital performance that establish the penalization points and there value. These calculations 
allows to reach the base remuneration value which covers the hospital’s whole production. 
To achieve the SNS total payment, some amounts are subtracted to the base remuneration. 
These amounts are the payments received from other sources, which is the sum of the money 
inflow to the private partner from patients and Third-party Agents according to the models 
specified earlier in this chapter. Another amount subtracted, is the money due to the public 
partner from commercial activities of the hospital, as well as partial profits from third-party 
financiers’ payments for hospital services. All of these values are calculated twice for each year, 
once before the year starts as a forecast value and after the year ends to obtain the actual value. 
The forecasted values are used to establish a beforehand amount to finance the hospital 
operations on a daily basis. The amount equals ninety percent of the forecasted SNS total 
payment and is distributed in monthly payments to the private partner, transferred by the end 
of each month. The remaining amount to be paid by the public partner is retained until all figures 
are confirmed and the actual SNS total payment is determined. 
Due to the partnership inherent circumstances the process to determine the forecasts has 
established timeframes for both parties to contribute with their point of view. The process starts 
with a negotiation between the private and public partners in the first half of November of the 
previous year. If a consensus is not achieved in negotiations until the deadline, the public partner 
will unilaterally calculate the predicted production using the forecasts considerations described 
in the contract. Among the considerations used to forecast there are quantitative indicators, 
such as, service required by the hospital’s area population in the previous 5 years and results 
obtained in the past year. However, to achieve a more realistic and comprehensive estimate, 
some qualitative considerations must be contemplated. These considerations allow an 
adjustment for Hospital overall capacity, hospital yearly investments possibilities and hospital 
inherent circumstances due to the possible building transfer problems or related issues. 
During the year the private partner is obligated to send two types of reports to the public 
partner, as described in the contract. Quarterly a report is sent with operational data from 
services provided to current financial figures and hospital maintenance information. This report 
allows the public partner to be aware of the hospital performance as the year progresses. The 
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second mandatory report is biannually and has secondary information, such as patients and 
professionals’ surveys results, accreditation processes and self-monitoring evaluations. After the 
end of the year the real values need to be determined and confirmed by both parties, this is 
done on a flexible timeframe. 
3.4. Structure, Scope and Functions of Enhanced Health and Welfare Services 
Following the guidelines of the research protocol, the next aspect to be analyzed is the 
characteristics of the enhanced service program. Each partnership project provides medical care 
and public health through a hospital based facility. The institution is a decentralized extension 
of the SNS responsible for the health of the stipulated area’s population. The partnership 
involves all activities, resources and personnel need and linked to the hospital in question. In 
the agreement, the public partner acts as a financial provider and the private partner is the 
service provider. As described in the contract, decision making and operational processes are of 
private partner’s full responsibility. All health professionals involved in the hospital, as well as 
administrative personnel are selected, trained, paid and managed by the private partner. This 
partner also negotiates and manages all relations with suppliers and third-party agents. The 
supervision and inspection responsibilities falls on the public partner through an agent, the 
contract manager, and his team. Each partnership has a designated contract manager who 
confirms the fulfilment of all contract obligations, performs the liaison duties between both 
partners and writes frequent reports describing the situation to the public partner. 
In these contracts the private partners are more susceptible to risk. The prices and limits to 
activities in all services are mostly established and linked to a reference group of public hospitals 
with similar characteristics. The service parameters and expected service quality are described 
in great detail, as well as performance measurements indicators. The contract stipulates 
penalizations and deductions linked to performance that could contribute only in the public 
partner favor. The financial model dictates that ninety percent of the expected payment from 
the public partner should be paid every month of the year to which it relates. However, the 
remaining ten percent of the total payment is only paid after the figures of the year are 
calculated and evaluation indicators checked. These characteristics allow for a mitigation of the 
financial risk for the public partner. Other risks to be considered are operational and 
procurement risks. These risk are mainly supported by the private partner in their management 
responsibilities and decisions. As public partner plays the role of financier and supervisor, the 
burden of achieving the expected outcomes with the imposed obligations fall into the private 
partner. Also, as explained above, private partner has the responsibility to negotiate the deals 
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with suppliers, insurance companies and other stakeholders. All these risks are seen as an 
incentive to private partner involvement as he is able to profit from the conditions achieved. 
This characteristics of the partnership establishes a scenario where the public partner has a 
more predicted benefit and the private partner has more variable one. 
3.5. Government Policy Enacted to Promote Partnerships Efforts 
The public policy aspects of the protocol evaluates the governmental changes needed to 
implement the partnerships. In the Portuguese healthcare sector, six decree-laws were written 
to support the conditions of the PPP Hospitals’ contracts by adjusting the SNS rules. In 2002, the 
decree-law no. 185/2002 was written to establish the legal regime of the health partnerships 
with private management. This decree-law was updated afterwards by the decree-law no. 
86/2003 and decree-law no. 141/2006 with small adjustments. By 2010 the decree-law no. 
136/2010 applies several changes to the legalization to support the austerity measures. Some 
changes were the reduction of the administration board of the hospitals and the empowerment 
of ACSS to materialize and supervise the partnerships process. The latter change is further 
developed in the decree-law no. 1324/2011, defining the powers and responsibilities given to 
ACSS. Finally, the last decree-law to influence directly healthcare PPPs, is the decree-law no. 
111/2012 where the general norms applied to the creation and supervision of Healthcare PPPs 
are again reviewed and the UTAP is created. As an independent administrative entity under the 
Finance Ministry tutelage, UTAP assumes the responsibilities to monitor all PPPs processes in 
Portugal. Other policies and legislation also have influence in the Portuguese PPP hospitals, 
either by influencing all hospitals under the SNS or by affecting health care partnerships or 
public-private partnerships in general. However these policies and legislations do not strongly 
define the Portuguese Hospitals under a PPP agreement. 
3.6. Measuring outcomes of the Public-Private Partnership 
For the sixth aspect, the research protocol considers the outcome measurement of the 
partnership. The figures and data of this aspect are better exposed in section 4. 
3.7. Assessing issues of Equity 
This is the aspect most fulfilled by the Portuguese PPP Hospitals. Due to the universal coverage 
of the SNS, there are no distinctions in the treatment of people. This characteristic is distinctly 
stated in each partnership contract. Under the clause called Access to Health Services (Acesso 
às Prestações de Saúde) the contract states that the private partner must abide by the principle 
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of equality, assuring that all SNS beneficiaries have the right to equally access, attain and use of 
healthcare services. Another point described is the right of equal involvement, where everybody 
should be assisted according to the clinical priority criteria defined by the health care necessity. 
However, due to the private partner nature, universal coverage can be compromised if a medical 
situation emerges that conflicts with potential profits. This is a limitation to hospitals with PPP 
management model. Private partner use their expertise and are bound to act according to the 
written contract. But medical advances will be made during the contracts extension and 
situation can appear where a new procedure, drug or equipment could beneficially impact on 
the patient care. If such a similar situation would appear in a public hospital, the institution 
structure would allow it to put the patient welfare first and the moral responsibility to acquire 
the needed specialist, medication or technology would prevail. On a generic point of view the 
contract covers most conflicting possibilities, nonetheless not all scenarios can be predicted. 
3.8. Identifying Potential Weakness of the Analysis 
This final aspect of the protocol calls for an analysis on the problems encountered during the 
implementation of the protocol. The first and more revealing weakness of this study is related 
with the lack of updated and unprocessed information about the PPP contracts and the health 
national service. During this study an extensive search was performed and many institutions 
were approached with the purpose of collecting sufficient and unbiased data. Unfortunately the 
process was not completely successful and considerable gaps of the analysis still remain to be 
studied. Another weakness of this analysis is the reduced time spam of the PPP hospitals 
associated with a small sample of observable institutions. Although another hospital under a 
PPP regime was made in Portugal the time lapse and the differences among contracts, outcast 
that hospital from the group presented here. 
3.9. Protocol summary 
Overall the Portuguese hospital under PPP regimes satisfy the aspects of the protocol presented 
in this section. Every hospital has a well-defined public and private partner, likewise the 
relationship between them is explicitly characterized. There is room for improvement in the 
understanding of the nature and expected outcomes of each of the partners, especially the 
private partner’s expected benefits. The financial arrangements, structure and scope of the 
partnerships were sufficiently detailed in the contracts that were signed. A more detailed 
analysis about the constraints or gaps in the legal framework by professionals in that field would 
be beneficial for a more profound understanding of environment in which the partnerships 
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operate. The equity assessment and the weaknesses of the analysis are satisfactorily described 





4. Data Analysis 
The Portuguese experience with health PPPs is both rich and very significant. The pioneering 
statute of the country in this regard has already been mentioned in section 2. There are already 
detailed and exhaustive studies of this experience. But the literature hardly has isolated the case 
of health. It can broadly be divided in studies relative to the whole of PPP experience, of which 
health is but a part7 and evaluations of the complete health sector8. Simões (2004) remains the 
only academic study of the relevant intersection. Unfortunately the early date of the analysis 
seriously impairs its relevance. Another important drawback of most of these analyses is that 
they are generally limited to the financial elements, neglecting performance, services and other 
results. 
This thesis carries a preliminary study of the performance of the four PPP Hospitals. The 
unfortunate obstacles faced in the process of data collection, justify the sketchy nature of the 
exercise. Future research will certainly allow further and deeper consideration. The database 
used is from the monthly monitoring of hospitals performance by the ACSS9. 
The thesis performs two exercises, in a preliminary attempt to capture the specificity of the PPP 
model inside the health sector. Avoiding the traditional financial and cost consideration, the 
thesis will be centered on the production of health service. The first section is dedicated to 
measurement of service not only in dimension but also in quality and type. This is called service 
analysis. Section two tries a much more sketchy consideration of productivity and efficiency 
measurement, entitled productivity analysis. All the database is limited to the years of 2012, 
2013 and 2014. 
4.1. Service analysis 
To perform this analysis data about the operational traits of hospitals, data was collected for the 
51 institutions from the five ARS, presented in the next table. 
Insert table 1 [Hospital Centers, Health Units and Hospitals] here 
The next tables will present the average of each indicator for the national average (the average 
of all the 51 institutions) and the value of each of the four PPP Hospitals (Cascais, Loures, VFXira, 
Braga). 
                                                          
7 Basílio (2011), Sarmento and Renneboog (2014) and the reports of Tribunal de Contas and Ministério 
das Finanças. 
8 Costa and Lopes (2007), Ministério da Saúde (2010), World Health Organization (2010), Deloitte (2011) 




The first table deals with size variables. These pertain to services rendered either in 
consultations (consultas), hospitalizations (internamentos), emergency care (atendimentos), 
surgeries (cirurgias) or discharges (saídas de internamento). As indicated in the previous table, 
some of the institutions considered had more than one hospital, being hospital centers or health 
units. Consequently all these variables pertaining to each of these composite units were 
averaged by the correspondent number of hospitals, to give a level per hospital. 
Insert table 2 [Service analysis absolute indicators] here 
The general picture of the table is one in which only Braga Hospital is significantly larger than 
the national average. It is significant that, although of average dimension both hospitals Cascais 
and specially the one in Loures stand out at emergency consultations and, in the case of the last, 
also in initial consultations. This could signal some qualitative difference. 
Next table deals with length of treatment and rehospitalization cases. The first element is 
evaluated both in the number of days of hospitalization and the percentage of tenure above 30 
days. The second aspect is measured by the percentage of rehospitalization after 5, 30 and 
between 31 and 180 days. 
Insert table 3 [Service analysis Hospitalization indicators] here 
The PPP group fails to stand out from the global group, with only Cascais Hospital having a 
smaller number of late rehospitalizations, a treat which became more salient in 2014. 
The consideration of surgery activity, presented in the next table, is analysed in three 
dimensions. The first variable indicates the percentage of schedule surgeries with a waiting time 
above the guaranteed response time (TMRG - tempo máximo de resposta garantido). The last 
element is the type of childbirth, considering the percentage of c-sections. 
Insert table 4 [Service analysis surgeries indicators] here 
The table confirms the similarity between PPP hospitals and all the others, with the exception 
of Loures Hospital, having a significant smaller percentage of c-sections and extremely delayed 
surgeries. Again this could point to a qualitative prominence. 
The last table analyzes the efficiency and other characteristics of outpatients and emergency 
consultations. The following elements are considered: the percentage of initial consultations, 
percentage of initial consultations performed inside the adequate time, percentage of first 
discharge follow-up consultations, percentage of consultations not performed and percentage 
of emergency consultations resulting in hospitalization. 
Insert table 5 [Service analysis consultations indicators] here 
It is interesting to note that 2014 changed the general picture of similarity of PPP with the 
environment registered in 2013. Loures had a smaller percentage of consultations in adequate 
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time, indicating now a low quality problem. In Vila Franca de Xira Hospital, the size of no-shows 
(non-performed consultations) was very significantly higher. 
The first consistent observation that is concurrent in all tables shown a similarity between PPP 
hospital figures and the public hospitals. The second is a slightly positive trend of the hospitals 
service levels from 2013 to 2014. Another very clear observation in this analysis is the highly 
significant values of the Braga Hospital in the absolute indicators’ table. This increased number 
of services performed could be explained by the difference in dimension between the Braga and 
the rest of the hospitals, especially from Vila Franca de Xira which is the smallest of the group. 
The final observation of the tables highlights the Loures Hospital contrast with the national 
average in initial consults, total emergency consults, percentage of surgeries with time above 
guaranteed and percentage of births by c-section. 
4.2. Productivity analysis 
The other aspect of PPP hospitals this thesis aims to describe is, as said, operational efficiency, 
which combines the service elements with measurement of input. The main difficulty faced was 
that the database of monthly monitoring by the ACSS10 which has been used so far, does not 
include any indication of doctors, nurses and other resources in each of the hospitals. This data, 
available at the INE has the problem of being organized by county and district and not by 
institution. 
Fortunately, for each of the four PPP hospitals it is very simple to make a mapping with a 
particular county, as they are unique in that geographical demarcation11. As it was impossible to 
do a similar exercise for the other 47 institutions, the study is limited to a comparison with the 
national average. This eliminates the intra-sample standard deviation, thus precluding the 
statistical tests included in the last section. Availability of the data forces the study to center 
only in 2012 and 2013. 
Lacking statistical significance measurement, the analysis used percentage distance as an 
evaluation of disparity between each PPP hospital and national average. By this approach, a very 
intense variability is shown in the next tables. 
If in the previous section the general picture was one of similarity in what regards the product 
and service of the hospitals, when considering productivity, measured by the relationship 
between services and input, the trend is now on of divergence and disparity. 
                                                          
10 http://benchmarking.acss.min-saude.pt/monitormensal.aspx 
11 It was considered that Hospital de Braga corresponds to the county of Braga, Hospital de Loures with 
the county of Loures, Hospital de Cascais with the county of Cascais and Hospital de Vila Franca de Xira to 
the county of Vila Franca de Xira. 
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The output variables used are total numbers of consultations, patients discharged, programmed 
surgeries and emergency consultations. 
The inputs considered for each hospital include several elements. The first is staff, distributed 
through total and its main components, medical doctors, nurses, nursing assistants, therapeutic 
and diagnostic technicians and administrative staff (others). Physical inputs include hospital 
beds and operating rooms (these are only considered as relevant for surgery and hospitalization 
variables). 
The analysis also includes the relationship between the service variable and the total population 
in the region served by the healthcare institution. If the previous measurement try to capture 
internal efficiency, this aims at another aspect of productivity namely its impact on society. This 
last variable is measured per thousand persons. 
In what regards the production of consultations, the general picture is one of higher efficiency 
at PPP hospitals as measured by the level per unit of staff. Braga Hospital stands out with in both 
years. The clear exceptions are, in 2012, the hospitals of Loures and Vila Franca de Xira, with 
significantly negative diversions. Curiously enough in 2013 Loures joins Braga at the top while 
Vila Franca de Xira, the most recent of all the PPP hospitals, improves significantly its position. 
Insert table 6 [Productivity analysis total consultations] here 
It is also relevant to note that the advantage in productivity of PPP hospitals is decisively more 
marked in auxiliary and administrative personnel. 
Consultations are the main activity in hospitals, so the picture in the previous table dominates 
the environment but other aspects of the service may be more significant. The positive pattern 
seen in consultations is strongly enhanced when considering emergency situations. Here all PPP 
hospitals present a high advantage relative to the national average, in many cases more than 
double. 
Insert table 7 [Productivity analysis total emergency consultations] here 
In both years Cascais Hospital stands out above all others, with Loures catching up in 2013. The 
Braga Hospital, which held the undisputed first place in consultations productivity, is now the 
last in the ranking.  Although the advantages is across the board of personnel types, technicians 
show the highest positive divergence. 
The general pattern of the situation regarding surgeries is understandingly very similar to the 
one in consultations, although in a much more salient way. The divergent motive in 2012, having 
Braga Hospital strongly above and Loures significantly below national average, is now again 
corrected in 2013, with all above. The main difference is that the role of less laggard which Vila 
Franca de Xira had in consultations is now played by Cascais. Again, less specialized tasks 
(auxiliary, paramedics and administrative) show the highest productivity. 
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Insert table 8 [Productivity analysis programmed surgeries] here 
Physical infrastructures, not considered in previous tables for obvious reasons, are now very 
relevant. It is very interesting to note that the pattern of personnel is replicated when 
considering hospital beds and operating rooms. 
Patients discharge is a variable which captures in a much more direct way the production of a 
hospital. Consultations and services represent activity, while discharges measure results. 
Insert table 9 [Productivity analysis patients discharged] here 
Again there is a similarity of patterns with other tables. In fact this case mimics but in less salient 
way the picture of general higher productivity of PPPs seen in emergency consultations. Vila 
Franca de Xira holds the first place in 2012, but Cascais and even more Loures capture that 
position in 2013. It should be noted that the variation between consecutive years, which is 
visible in almost all tables is very significant and recommends further and deeper studies. 
The indicator for which the advantage is less marked is the only physical one considered 
relevant, hospital beds. Administrative staff is like in most previous cases the dimension in which 
productivity is more salient. 
Having considered what was named “internal efficiency”, we now turn our attention to a 
different angle of productivity: the relationship between the output of the hospital service and 
the size of the population served. This calculation is obviously a very crude way of capturing this 
element, and can only be considered somewhat relevant if a clear and undisputed picture 
surfaces. 
Insert table 10 [Productivity analysis population] here 
It could be said this is the case. When measuring activity, with the previous output variables as 
percentage of inputs, the results, as said, depicted a clear advantage of PPP Hospitals relative to 
national average. When relating the same variables with the population served, now the reverse 
patterns arises, with almost all the hospitals in all the dimensions considered showing clear 
negative discrepancy. It is not the task of this thesis to present a clear-cut explanation of this 
result but it surely points to several purposeful meanings. 
One consistent observation present in all tables is the clear higher productivity levels of the PPP 






The thesis intends to evaluate the effectiveness of the Portuguese PPP hospitals. With this aim, 
the study started by comparing the contracts with the aspects raised by Dr. Barr’s research 
protocol. In general the contracts satisfy each of the aspects evaluated. The partnership 
structure, scope, entities, relationship, financial arrangements and equity impact are fully 
characterized allowing a good understanding of the situation. Further analysis could be 
beneficial in the understanding of the government enactment legal framework as well as 
expected outcomes from each partners’ point of view. 
The study continued to an evaluation of outcomes as proposed by one of the aspects in the 
protocol. Due to the information available, the exercise focused on services and productivity 
analysis between 2012 and 2014. 
The service analysis showed much resemblance between the national average and the 
partnerships in most of the indicators with some quite pertinent exceptions. The productivity 
examination revealed a distinctive positive difference of PPP hospitals in comparison with 
national average. A conclusion indicating a higher effectiveness level of the partnerships 
allowing them to perform equally with a lower number of resources. 
Another result shown in service and productivity analysis, was a consistent positive trend in PPP 
hospitals. A coherent improvement tendency present in most partnerships in all indicators 
implying a constant effort of PPP management to progress and develop their institutions. 
It is necessary, in order to better understand each PPP hospital’s results to launch a small 
discussion about the some surrounding factors around each and every private partner involved. 
Hospital de Braga demonstrated, globally, better results than the national average and other 
PPP hospitals. Braga Hospital had the advantage of being a bigger and central hospital in its area, 
however, the positive results were also observed in clear comparison between hospitals in the 
same circumstances. This positive results could be explained by the private partner’s previous 
valuable experience with the Amadora-Sintra PPP in 1995 to 2008. 
Nonetheless Vila Franca de Xira, a hospital with the same private partner does not show the 
same results. This observation can be misleading due to external reasons. As the most recent of 
the four partnerships, Vila Franca de Xira completed in 2013 the transfer from the old building 
to the new facilities. This time consuming action surely impacted negatively the Hospital’s 
productivity results. At a cruising state, this recent PPP with new facilities is expected to take off 
in terms of productivity. 
Similar positive tendency to improve results can be observed at the Loures Hospital, also a 
recent PPP started in 2012 as a green field project. The fresh start allowed this hospital to choose 
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and adjust their medical team to Luz Saúde culture and management style, instead of absorbing 
established institutions. 
Cascais Hospital demonstrated a higher similarity to national values than the other PPPs 
institutions. This performance should be observed remembering the ties that its private partner, 
Lusíadas Saúde, had to the public sector. As part of Grupo Caixa Geral de Depósitos by the time 
the contract was signed, Cascais Hospital had a disadvantage compared to other PPPs in 
negotiating with the public partner. This disadvantage could had impacted in personnel 
selection and operational management, explaining the low degree of variability of the hospital 
performance. 
It is important to observe that in both service and productivity analysis all PPPs had significantly 
better and higher values on emergency consultations. This observation could hint at the 
importance of demographical factors when analysing the results. The population served by 
Cascais Hospital exhibit high differences of social classes. This factor combined with the 
proximity to Lisbon, attracts patients, especially from the lower social classes, to already 
established Lisbon hospitals. Given that these hospitals have a high level of response, this, 
impact negatively in Cascais Hospital output numbers. 
On the other hand, below average response to patients from hospital surrounding neighbouring 
areas of the Vila Franca de Xira Hospital end up unknowingly improving this hospital’s activity 
numbers. Unfortunately for this study, these demographical factors are hard to describe and 
quantify with a high degree of certainty. 
Further analysis is undoubtedly necessary for a better understanding and evaluation of the 
Portuguese PPP hospitals. Future studies that can collect more detailed data from hospitals 
outputs and characteristics would be beneficial for a detailed analysis with different indicators. 
A better perception of environmental characteristics like demographical habits and SNS 
interactions would allow an insightful analysis of each hospital efficiency and effectiveness in 
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Forecasts  are determined in the previous year 
considering:
 - Inherent circumstances to the Hospital transfer and 
related issues;
 - Services required by the hospital's population area in the 
previous 5 years;
 -Services performed to the surrounding populations;
 - Production figures and results obtain in the past year;
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 - Initial prices and classes estimates described in the 
contract.
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services provided to Third-party Financiers - 75% remaining value of Third-party 
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Appendix 2: image 2[PPP Hospital financial formulas] 
Source: author  
Production (Services provided) Variation of production calculation 
Availabil ity (avalabil ity of Emergency 
Department)
Medication (adjustments according to 
precribed medication)
Deductions (deductions according to 
performance evaluation/y failures)
Prod = Hospitalization and surgery (Hosp) + Hospitalization of qualified patients (Hosp 
QP) + Emergency (Emerg) + Outpatients Appointments (Outpat) + Day Hospital Consults 
(Day Hosp) + Special Cases (Spec Cases)
Availabil ity= ER basis availability * {1 - [ 
number of unavailable sessions / (4 * days of 
the year)]}
Medic= (20% * ( contribution reference per capita 
- expenditure incurred by the state per capita)) * 
NHS assisted patients
Deductions= sum of deductions value + min ( 
penalization points * point value; 5% base)
Hosp= Remuneration according to Class/Quotas 1 (RC) + Remuneration according to 
Class/Quotas 2 (RC)
ER basis availability= ER basis availability t-1 * ( 
Consumer Price Index t / Consumer Price Index 
t-1) + emergency correction differential
 maximum of penalization is 666.6 points
RC= full time equivalent patient (Eq Pat) * reference price * min (index of current 
complexity; average of index of complexity for the past 5 years)
RC= reference price * (sum( Eq Pat of each 
type of service * index of complexity of each 
type of service))
Index of complexity= ((sum of Eq Pat 1 * relative weight 1) + (sum of Eq. Pat 2 * relative 
weight 2)) / (sum of Eq Pat 1 + sum of Eq Pat 2)
Index of complexity= ((sum Eq Pat of each 
type of service * relative weight) / (sum Eq 
Pat of each type of service)
Equivalent Patients = sum of equivalence factors for each activity
Hosp QP= min ( days of hosp QP * price; renumeration fixed by the Ministry)
ER= Emergency Care 1 * price 1 + Emergency care 2 * price 2
Outpat= min [min(first appointment; limit) * price 1 appointments + {max (total 
appointments - limit first appointment; 0) + 2 appointmnets} * price 2 appointments; 
renumeration limit]
Day Hospital= min (sum of sessions * price; renumeration limit)
Spec Cases= sum (number of activities * price of activities)
Prices adjusted according to the anual variation (Consumer Price Index/Inhabitant)
Total price covered by the NHS cannot exceed the total used in the public tabulted prices
BASE REMUNERATION (4 aspects) = PRODUCTION + AVAILABILITY + MEDICATION -  DEDUCTIONS
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Appendix 3: table 1 [Hospital Centers, Health Units and Hospitals] 
ARS 


























Centro Hospitalar Cova da Beira, EPE 2 
Centro Hospitalar do Alto Ave, EPE 2 Centro Hospitalar de Leiria, EPE 3 
Centro Hospitalar do Médio Ave, EPE 2 Centro Hospitalar do Baixo Vouga, EPE 3 
Centro Hospitalar do Porto, EPE 2 
Centro Hospitalar e Universitário de 
Coimbra, EPE 
2 
Centro Hospitalar Entre Douro e 
Vouga, EPE 
3 Centro Hospitalar Tondela-Viseu, EPE 2 
Centro Hospitalar Póvoa de 
Varzim/Vila do Conde, EPE 
2 
Hospital Distrital da Figueira da Foz, 
EPE 
1 
Centro Hospitalar Tâmega e Sousa, 
EPE 
2 
Instituto Português Oncologia de 
Coimbra, EPE 
1 
Centro Hospitalar Trás-os-Montes e 
Alto Douro, EPE 
4 
Unidade Local de Saúde da Guarda, 
EPE 
2 
Centro Hospitalar Vila Nova de 
Gaia/Espinho, EPE 
3 
Unidade Local de Saúde de Castelo 
Branco, EPE 
1 
Hospital de Magalhães Lemos, EPE 1 
Centro Medicina de Reabilitação da 
Região Centro Rovisco Pais 
1 
Hospital Santa Maria Maior, EPE 1 Hospital Arcebispo Joao Crisóstomo 1 
Instituto Português Oncologia de 
Porto, EPE 
1 Hospital Dr. Francisco Zagalo 1 
Unidade Local de Saúde de 
Matosinhos, EPE 
1 Hospital José Luciano de Castro 1 
Unidade Local de Saúde do Alto 
Minho, EPE 
2 ARS 
HOSPITAL CENTERS, HEALTH UNIT or 
HOSPITAL 
N. 




















Centro Hospitalar Barreiro/Montijo, 
EPE 
2 
Hospital de Braga, PPP 1 
Centro Hospitalar de Lisboa Central, 
EPE 
5 
Hospital da Perlada 1 




HOSPITAL CENTERS, HEALTH UNIT or 
HOSPITAL 










Hospital Espírito Santo de Évora, EPE 1 Centro Hospitalar Lisboa Norte, EPE 2 
Unidade Local de Saúde do Baixo 
Alentejo, EPE 
2 Centro Hospitalar Médio Tejo, EPE 3 
Unidade Local de Saúde do Litoral 
Alentejano, EPE 
1 Hospital Distrital de Santarém, EPE 1 
Unidade Local de Saúde do Norte 
Alentejo, EPE 
2 Hospital Fernando da Fonseca, EPE 1 
ARS 
HOSPITAL CENTERS, HEALTH UNIT or 
HOSPITAL 









Centro Hospitalar do Algarve, EPE 3 
Instituto Português Oncologia de 
Lisboa, EPE 
1 
Hospital de Cascais, PPP 1 
Hospital de Loures, PPP 1 
   Hospital de Vila Franca de Xira, PPP 1 
   Centro Hospitalar do Oeste 5 
  
 
Centro Hospitalar Psiquiátrico de 
Lisboa 
1 





Appendix 4: table 2 [Service analysis absolute indicators] 
  National Cascais Loures VFXira Braga 






131952 133603 240755 111485 382124** 
Initial consultations 38334 47325 90217** 44035 123406*** 
Subsequent consultations 93619 86278 150538 67450 258718** 
Total emergency 
consultation 
86354 153197* 185124** 110232 185132** 
Patients discharged  10058 12035 19808* 12041 25635** 
Programmed surgeries  6819 6375 9417 7099 23329*** 
Outpatients pr. surgeries 3847 4491 5969 4243 14456*** 
Hospit. pr. surgeries  3170 1884 3448 2856 8873*** 
Emergency surgeries 1363 2278 2095 1420 2684 
       






135122 137962 273176 130947 408531*** 
Initial consultations 38910 49724 90238** 49155 130778*** 
Subsequent consultations 95995 88238 182938 81792 277753** 
Total emergency 
consultation 
86384 159357* 196583** 121573 192022** 
Patients discharged  9915 12331 20912* 13177 25855** 
Programmed surgeries  6938 6814 11218 8390 24707*** 
Outpatients pr. surgeries 4030 4993 7373 5563 15246*** 
Hospit. pr. surgeries  3102 1821 3845 2827 9461*** 
Emergency surgeries 1319 2331 2092 1136 2723* 




Appendix 5: table 3 [Service analysis Hospitalization indicators] 
  National Cascais Loures VFXira Braga 






10,4 6,9 7,2 7,2 7,8 
% Hospit. Above 30 daysd 3,4 1,1 2,9 2,1 3,0 
% Rehospit. 5 days 2,3 1,8 2,1 2,9 2,2 
% Rehospit. 30 days 8,8 6,9 8,6 8,6 7,8 
% Rehospit 31-180 days 10,7 7,7* 10,7 9,6 9,6 
 
      






10,3 6,7 7,3 7,3 7,7 
% Hospit. Above 30 daysd 3,4 1,7 3,2 2,3 3,0 
% Rehospit. 5 days 2,3 1,6 2,1 1,9 2,1 
% Rehospit. 30 days 8,7 6,5 8,4 7,4 7,6 
% Rehospit 31-180 days 10,7 6,3** 11,0 9,6 9,6 




Appendix 6: table 4 [Service analysis surgeries indicators] 
  National Cascais Loures VFXira Braga 





 89,6 87,8 72,7** 97,4 87,1 
% outpatients surgeries 57,8 70,4 63,4 59,8 62,0 
% of births by c-section 31,1 30,0 22,1** 30,1 31,1 
       





 – - - - - 
% outpatients surgeries 58,8 73,3 65,7 66,3 61,7 
% of births by c-section 28,4 27,3 19,6** 24,4 29,3 
** significantly different at 95% 
Appendix 7: table 5 [Service analysis consultations indicators] 
  National Cascais Loures VFXira Braga 






30,6 35,4 37,5 39,5 32,3 
% Initial cons. in adequate time 77,7 68,1 63,6 87,6 64,1 
% Consultation after discharge 7,7    11,0 
% Non-performed consultations 7,7 12,1  11,2 8,7 
% Emergency cons. with hospitalization 8,3 6,1 7,0 8,4 8,9 
       






30,6 36,0 33,0 37,5 32,0 
% Initial cons. in adequate time 78,2 69,6 49,0** 69,3 73,6 
% Consultation after discharge 11,1   14,3 14,5 
% Non-performed consultations 9,0 11,2  23,6** 8,6 
% Emergency cons. with hospitalization 9,5 6,0 6,7 8,3 8,6 
** significantly different at 95% 
Appendix 8:table 6 [Productivity analysis total consultations] 
  Total consultations 







118 128 88ºº 114 170+ 
Doctors 623 611 511º 549º 710 
Nurses 353 366 284º 345 511+ 
Nursing assistants 543 495 398ºº 453º 664+ 
Therap. and Diagn. Tech. 1.689 2.188+ 2.522+ 1.686 3.024++ 
Other staff 628 1.029++ 336ºº 785+ 1.493+++ 
  







124 145 184+ 118 174+ 
Doctors 636 675 937+ 652 732 
Nurses 373 420 587++ 345 551+ 
Nursing assistants 525 583 777+ 470º 632+ 
Therap. and Diagn. Tech. 1.779 2.386+ 7.296+++ 1.770 3.184++ 
Other staff 744 1.086+ 813 758 1.493+++ 
+ positive difference to national average above 20%; ++ positive difference to national average above 50%; +++ 
positive difference to national average above 100%; º negative difference to national average above -10%; ºº negative 
difference to national average above -25% 
30 
 
Appendix 9: table 7 [Productivity analysis total emergency consultations] 
  Total emergency consultations 







62 156+++ 98++ 130+++ 84+ 
Doctors 329 747+++ 568++ 628++ 351 
Nurses 187 447+++ 315++ 395+++ 253+ 
Nursing assistants 287 606+++ 443++ 518++ 328 
Therap. and Diagn. Tech. 892 2.677+++ 2.804+++ 1.929+++ 1.494++ 
Other staff 332 1.258+++ 374 898+++ 738+++ 







65 166+++ 142+++ 117++ 84+ 
Doctors 332 774+++ 720+++ 645++ 355 
Nurses 195 482+++ 452+++ 341++ 267+ 
Nursing assistants 274 669+++ 597+++ 465++ 306 
Therap. and Diagn. Tech. 929 2.736+++ 5.610+++ 1.750++ 1.543++ 
Other staff 389 1.246+++ 625++ 750++ 723++ 
+ positive difference to national average above 20%; ++ positive difference to national average above 50%; +++ 
positive difference to national average above 100% 
 
Appendix 10: table 8 [Productivity analysis programmed surgeries] 
  Programmed surgeries 







6 5 4ºº 7 11++ 
Doctors 30 24º 22ºº 32 45++ 
Nurses 17 15º 12ºº 20+ 32++ 
Nursing assistants 26 20º 17ºº 27 42++ 
Therap. and Diagn. Tech. 81 87 107+ 99+ 190+++ 
Other staff 30 41+ 14ººº 46++ 94+++ 
Hospital beds 23 17º 13ºº 24 36++ 
Operating rooms 924 799º 368ººº 1.783++ 1.330+ 
  







6 7 8+ 8+ 11++ 
Doctors 30 32 38+ 42+ 45+ 
Nurses 18 20 24+ 22+ 34++ 
Nursing assistants 25 28 32+ 30+ 39++ 
Therap. and Diagn. Tech. 84 114+ 298+++ 113+ 194+++ 
Other staff 3 52+ 33 48+ 91+++ 
Hospital beds 24 23 24 29+ 38++ 
Operating rooms 931 1.063 702º 789º 1.372+ 
+ positive difference to national average above 20%; ++ positive difference to national average above 50%; +++ 
positive difference to national average above 100%; º negative difference to national average above -10%; ºº negative 




Appendix 11: table 9 [Productivity analysis patients discharged] 
  Patients discharged 







9 13+ 10 14++ 12+ 
Doctors 47 60+ 60+ 66+ 51 
Nurses 26 36+ 33+ 41++ 37+ 
Nursing assistants 41 49+ 47 54+ 47 
Therap. and Diagn. Tech. 126 215++ 295+++ 202++ 216++ 
Other staff 47 101+++ 39º 94+++ 107+++ 
Hospital beds 36 43 35 49+ 41 
 







9 13+ 15++ 13+ 12+ 
Doctors 46 61+ 77++ 70++ 49 
Nurses 27 38+ 48++ 37+ 37+ 
Nursing assistants 38 53+ 64++ 51+ 42 
Therap. and Diagn. Tech. 128 215++ 600+++ 191+ 214++ 
Other staff 54 98++ 67+ 82++ 100++ 
Hospital beds 37 43 47+ 50+ 41 
+ positive difference to national average above 20%; ++ positive difference to national average above 50%; +++ 
positive difference to national average above 100%; º negative difference to national average above -10% 
 
Appendix 12: table 10 [Productivity analysis population] 
Population (in thousands) 
 Total consultations 
 National Cascais Loures VFXira Braga 
2012 1.130 361ººº 426ººº 295ººº 1.238 
2013 1.176 399ººº 840ºº 361ººº 1.318 
 Patients discharged 
 National Cascais Loures VFXira Braga 
2012 84 35ººº 50ºº 35ººº 89 
2013 85 36ººº 69ºº 39ººº 88 
 Programmed surgeries 
 National Cascais Loures VFXira Braga 
2012 54 14ºº 18ººº 17ººº 78+ 
2013 56 19ºº 34ºº 23ººº 80+ 
 Total emergency consultation 
 National Cascais Loures VFXira Braga 
2012 596 441ºº 473º 338ºº 612 
2013 614 458ºº 646 357ºº 639 
+ positive difference to national average above 20%; º negative difference to national average above -10%; ºº negative 
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